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ABSTRACT. Research linking ethnic cleavages to economic underdevelopment is 
a hallmark of recent efforts to explain economic growth. Similarly, the rule of law as a 
credible commitment to property rights and contract enforcement is also identified 
with economic development. Rather than treating these factors as rival explanations 
for economic development around the world, I propose the rule of law as the causal 
mechanism through which ethnic fractionalization (EF) influences growth in many 
countries. I argue ethnic diversity negatively impacts the rule of law due to the 
prevalence of ethnically-based patronage networks in developing countries. Public 
officials, I argue, face greater incentives to undermine the rule of law in societies with 
pervasive ethnic cleavages than in those without. I employ pooled cross-sectional, 
time-series data for 55 developing countries between 1996 and 2010 to test my 
theoretical argument. Ultimately, my research demonstrates ethnic fractionalization’s 
deleterious effect on the rule of law and provides a uniform framework linking 
demographic inputs to economic outcomes.  
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1. Introduction  
  
The drive to explain underdevelopment occupies a significant portion of 
recent economic and political science scholarship. Explanations in the lit- 
erature hinge upon largely endogenous factors such as political institutions 
or exogenous concerns such as geography or international markets.1 Incre- 
asingly, research highlights the negative influence of ethnic heterogeneity in 
fostering growth and cooperation in society. For example, Easterly and Levine 
(1997) tie ethnic fractionalization (EF) to slow economic development, low 
income and inequitable distribution of wealth. Nauro et al. (2011) use a 
sophisticated instrumental estimation technique and still find evidence con- 
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necting high levels of ethnic fractionalization to low levels of economic 
growth (see also Scheuler and Weisbrod, 2010 and Campos, et al., 2007). 
Additionally, Habyarimana et al. (2007) describe how EF undermines public 
goods provision while La Porta et al. (1999) connect it to the low quality of 
governance in many countries. Feldmann (2012) finds a connection between 
high levels of ethnic fractionalization and high unemployment due to labor-
market inefficiency and Cerqueti et al. (2012) identify a relationship between 
high levels of fractionalization and high levels of corruption. Finally, Hodler 
and Knight (2012) demonstrate the negative impact of ethnic fractional- 
ization on the effectiveness of foreign aid. Previous literature associates EF 
with the distribution of resources and economic outcomes, but for the most 
part only provides untested speculation as to the underlying mechanism 
driving these relationships.2 Scholars still do not know precisely why high 
levels of ethnic fractionalization lead to slow economic development. To help 
inform policy, we must understand the mechanisms underpinning growth and 
development to comprehend what any macro-level relationships between 
ethnic fractionalization and economic development truly represent.  
I argue ethnic cleavages in society limit economic development by under- 
mining the rule of law. The institutional elements comprising the rule of law 
currently occupy a privileged position in explanations of growth.3 In this 
framework, societies governed by the rule of law feature the enforcement of 
codified regulations and equitable adjudication of disputes. The rule of law 
therefore influences economic development since economic decisions rest, in 
part, on whether contracts and property rights are enforced. The rule of law 
also influences investment decisions by altering the costs and risk of doing 
business. Growing evidence demonstrates its importance for development, 
yet we know relatively little about how the rule of law comes to exist in the 
first place. Some recent work emphasizes institutions: regime type (democracy/ 
authoritarian), electoral rules, or the strength of institutional checks and 
balances. Ignored, however, are a country’s demographics. This omission is 
important because many developing countries contain a wide variety of ethnic 
groups within their borders. Institutional solutions to bring about the rule of 
law will fail unless they take into account the ethnically driven socio-economic 
context in which they are implemented. Moreover, it stands to reason per- 
ceptions of the rule of law are driven by more than institutional phenomena. 
Most analysis on the rule of law centers on the need for functioning legal 
institutions that foster economic development. However, phenomena that 
influence perceptions of a state’s commitment to uphold contracts and en- 
force statutes may be equally as important (Barro and Gordon 1983; Mauro 
1995). Unexplored in the literature is how sociological variables such as ethnic 
diversity, linguistic cleavages or religious schisms may influence perceptions 
of governance.  
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This investigation resolves problems in the literature in several ways. 
First, I propose the rule of law as an intermediary conduit connecting ethnic 
fractionalization to economic development. A large literature already ties 
components of the rule of law such as property rights, contract enforcement 
and equitable treatment in the legal system to economic development. I 
provide a rationale for ethnic fractionalization’s influence on these phenomena 
and in turn on economic development. Second, I test my theoretical argument 
against panel data encompassing 55 developing countries from 1996–2010. 
Developing countries exhibit substantial variance in their levels of EF, types 
of political institutions and levels of the rule of law. They therefore offer an 
excellent natural laboratory in which to explore potential relationships between 
ethnicity, politics and economic development. In this vein, I explore whether 
the relationship between ethnic composition and the rule of law is robust to 
the inclusion of institutional variables often thought to influence assessments 
of governance. I find a strong, consistent relationship between ethnic frac- 
tionalization and perceptions of the rule of law. The rule of law suffers as 
ethnic divisions become more acute – even after controlling for factors thought 
to influence the rule of law such as regime type, political institutions or the 
level of wealth within a country.        
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The first section sum- 
marizes the theoretical rationale for linking ethnic fractionalization to the 
rule of law. The second section describes the variables and methodology of 
the project, while the final section describes the results, discusses their 
implications and identifies a direction for future research. 
 
2. Theory 
 
Recent scholarship identifies ethnic fractionalization (EF) as an important 
barrier to achieving economic development and political stability (Eifert, et 
al., 2010, Annet, 2001; Easterly and Levine, 1997). Easterly and Levine 
(1997) and Habyarimana et al. (2007) attribute EF’s negative influence on 
economic growth to struggles over scarce resources that divide along ethnic 
lines. For example, low spending on public goods may reflect ethnic divisions 
generating disagreements on the distribution of state resources. In turn, low 
provision of public goods maintains poverty for large segments of the pop- 
ulation and may limit long-term economic growth. In a different vein, other 
scholars contend ethnic fractionalization leads to dissatisfaction with govern- 
ment and increased public expenditure aimed at placating the populace 
(Annet, 2001). Alesina et al. (1999) even identify this phenomenon in the 
United States. Finally, several other studies have found evidence for ethnic 
heterogeneity’s negative impact on social capital and trust in society, which 
are in turn linked to economic development (Keefer and Knack, 1997; 
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Alesina and La Ferrarra, 1999). However, none of the aforementioned studies 
directly address and test ways in which ethnic divisions discourage invest- 
ment and promote underdevelopment. Scholarship will suffer and policies will 
fail to bring about economic development if policymakers cannot determine 
the channels through which ethnic cleavages exert their influence. For in- 
stance, the literature on EF describes a negative relationship with develop- 
ment, yet prematurely promotes institutions to mitigate its consequences. 
Easterly (2000) demonstrates the mitigating effects of legal protection for 
minorities, property rights, contract enforcement on economic decline in 
ethnically heterogeneous states. Such solutions are inadequate, however, if 
these institutions depend directly on the ethnic divisions in society. We 
currently do not know whether the economic gains Easterly observes stem 
from establishing the rule of law in general or if the specific ethnic emphasis 
of the policy generated economic growth. It is not possible to assess these 
arguments and craft appropriate policy until we know why or how EF under- 
mines economic development. Institutional solutions to ethnic cleavages 
should only be proffered once scholars gain a complete understanding of 
the way in which ethnic fractionalization decreases growth. 
Scholarship from economics helps to uncover the mechanism connecting 
ethnic fractionalization and economic development. For example, a mature 
body of work identifies several institutional elements necessary for economic 
development whose effectiveness may rest on a state’s ethnic divisions. Com- 
ponents of the rule of law, such as property rights, contract enforcement 
and equitable treatment by the judiciary are deemed critical in stimulating 
growth (Keefer and Knack, 2002; De Soto, 2000; Maravall and Przeworski, 
2003; Glinavos, 2008; Haggard et al. 2008; Hare, 2007; and Butkiewicz and 
Yanikkaya, 2006). Private enterprise, the argument goes, will be hindered 
if the public assumes that contracts and regulations will not be enforced or 
are unenforceable (North and Weingast 1989). Economic historians argue 
that the state’s credible commitment to enforce property rights allowed for 
the development of capital markets in the West (North and Weingast 1989; 
Rapaczynski 1996; Riker and Weimer 1995). Another strain of literature iden- 
tifies the ways in which transaction costs associated with entrepreneurial 
activity in the developing world are associated with a lack of enforceable 
property rights. Citizens lacking titled property or assurance against expro- 
priation are neither able to obtain credit based on collateral holdings nor 
reinvest capital in the development of private enterprise. The result is chronic 
underdevelopment of state and society as inefficient informal markets drain 
capital, prevent the collection of tax revenues, and preclude the provision 
of public goods in areas such as health care and education (De Soto, 1989, 
2000). 
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Perceptions of the rule of law can spur both foreign and domestic invest- 
ment, yet, the few studies that have examined property rights regimes and 
the rule of law have focused mainly on their relationship to economic devel- 
opment. This begs an important question: what determines perceptions of 
the rule of law in the first place? Political institutions may be an important 
part of the explanation, but they are unreliable determinants due to difficulties 
posed by disentangling myriad institutional elements and the endogeneity 
problems their evolution generates. By contrast, the level of ethnic frac- 
tionalization in a state is largely determined before current institutions are 
established in the developing world.4 It is therefore possible to measure the 
potential impact of EF on the performance of state protections for the rule 
of law.   
I anticipate a negative relationship between EF and the rule of law due to 
the incentives facing ethnically fractionalized public officials in developing 
countries. Clan, tribal and ethnic divisions in this environment often take 
precedence over national identity and may impact the credibility of national 
policies. EF can lead to opaque business transactions based on ethnic divi- 
sions and mistrust of the bureaucracy due to ethnic clientelism (Van de 
Walle, 2001). Economic development ultimately suffers as investment deci- 
sions become increasingly risky in ethnically-divided business environments. 
In general, I expect powerful groups holding the reins of government to 
treat out-group citizens disproportionately poorly due to pervasive ethnic 
cleavages. Countries with two or more major ethnic divisions are therefore 
likely to have more difficulty committing credibly to the rule of law than 
ethnically homogenous countries. Specifically, I expect large ethnic divisions 
to undermine any credible commitment to the rule of law through three main 
conduits: property rights, contract enforcement and equitable treatment by 
the judiciary. First, ethnic schisms can negatively impact perceptions of 
property rights if nationalization of out-group possessions is disproportionately 
common. It stands to reason that confidence in property rights will decrease 
if the probability of having one’s assets nationalized is notably lower for 
in-groups than out-groups as in public goods provision of Habyarimana et 
al. (2007) and Easterly and Levine (1997). Second, contract enforcement 
and perceptions of equitable treatment also suffer if politicians and judges 
offer preferential treatment to members of their own ethnicity. By this 
logic, increasing the number of ethnic groups in a country will damage the 
credibility of contracts and the judiciary. This in turn will lead to declining 
assessments of the rule of law, decreased investment and derailed development.  
In addition to ethnic fractionalization, I follow the theoretical literature 
and explore several institutional factors thought to influence the rule of law. 
These encompass the impact of regime type, proportional representation (PR) 
vs. single member plurality (SMP) systems, presidential vs. parliamentary 
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governance, a country’s colonial heritage, income inequality and overall 
levels of wealth on assessments of the rule of law.  
 
Democracy 
 
Democratization, among other things, is a process that increases the number 
of veto players through political competition, constraints on the chief exec- 
utive, and participation by an electorate. According to Kunicová and Rose-
Ackerman (2005), participation, political competition, and constraints on 
the chief executive all increase the ability of the population to monitor and 
legally constrain politicians from engaging in corrupt behavior. Brown et al. 
(2011) find a strong relationship between political polarization in democracies 
and control of corruption. Competition in democracies creates incentives for 
politicians to hold one another accountable. In the early stage of democrat- 
ization, rent-seeking behavior actually increases. Only after a certain level 
of democratization is reached will constraints be placed on malfeasance. 
These relationships are likely to emulate those concerning the rule of law- 
especially in the presence of high levels of ethnic fractionalization. There is 
also considerable evidence democracy improves the provision of public goods 
relative to authoritarian governance, which could indicate higher levels of 
cooperation and higher levels of the rule of law in democracies (Olken, 
2008, Keefer and Khemani, 2005).   
      Authoritarian governments are likely to harm the rule of law (Maravall 
and Przeworski, 2003). For instance, military governments or other types of 
authoritarian regimes may negatively impact the rule of law. An important 
point of separation between the head of state and the head of the armed 
forces is fused when the chief executive is a member of the military. With- 
out proper divisions, the military as an institution becomes exposed to politics: 
important decisions concerning promotion and retirement are made more 
on the basis of politics than on strict protocols set out in the military code. 
The military also becomes exposed to capture by private interests who now 
have to lobby the military in order to gain favorable dispensation from the 
government. The effect of each of these is likely exacerbated by high levels 
of ethnic fractionalization. Military leaders who belong to a minority group 
are likely to favor members of their own group over those of the majority, 
while leaders from the majority may exclude the minority group from many 
state programs. I expect military governments to produce negative assess- 
ments of the rule of law. 
      In contrast to the discussion above, there is some evidence suggesting 
democracy may have a negative impact on the rule of law. For example, 
Eifert et al. (2010) and Posner (2004) highlight the ways democratic com- 
petition politicizes and reinforces ethnic divisions. Democracy may very well 
deepen ethnic cleavages in society and undermine public goods provision, 
 26 
cooperation and the rule of law more so than in dictatorships. Overall, I am 
ambivalent as to whether democracy increases or decreases the ability of 
leaders to favor one ethnic group over another and thereby undermine or 
improve perceptions of the rule of law.      
 
Presidentialism vs. Parliamentarism 
 
The second broad institutional variation emphasized in studies on assess- 
ments of governance is the choice between presidential and parliamentary 
systems. For example, some scholars argue the centralization of power 
under presidential arrangements offers executives greater opportunities for 
malfeasance than does the legislative authority wielded by the leadership in 
parliamentary systems (Kunicova, 2003; Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005; 
Mainwaring, 1995; Shugart, 1998). While in presidential systems both the 
party leadership and the chief executive must approve legislation, the president 
frequently controls certain forms of patronage independent of a legislative 
check, and may even create new types of distribution via executive orders. 
With this unconstrained authority over the creation and distribution of pa- 
tronage, presidents are more likely to engage in inappropriate political behavior 
than are the heads of legislatures in parliamentary systems (Baldez and 
Carey, 1999; Cox and Morganstern, 2001; Kiewit and McCubbins, 1991; 
Sakwa, 2000). Parties are stronger in parliamentary systems, and checks are 
weaker because parties in presidential systems are not required to organize 
to form a government (Cox and Morganstern, 2001; Lijphart, 1984; Main- 
waring, 1995; Shugart, 1998). Additionally, the uncertain timing of elections 
may act to constrain parliamentary leadership due to the constant threat of 
no-confidence votes and subsequent dissolution. I anticipate these arguments 
to gain strength in ethnically-divided states. Coalition governments under 
parliament are likely to represent broader interests in society than a solitary 
executive. A single executive of one ethnic group is frequently given the 
broad authority afforded presidents. The potential for unilateral action against 
members of other ethnic groups thus increases dramatically relative to par- 
liamentary systems featuring coalition governments. I expect this phenomenon 
to generate more favorable assessments of the rule of law under parliamentary 
governments than in presidential systems.  
 
Electoral Rules 
 
Persson and Tabellini (2003) identify a number of reasons why PR and SMP 
systems are expected to create differing levels of governance. Individual 
ballots under majoritarian systems, the argument goes, provide direct account- 
ability for politicians, reducing opportunities for malfeasance. Yet at the same 
time, Persson and Tabellini note that the higher barriers to entry normally 
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associated with the smaller districts in plurality systems may give politicians 
more room to maneuver. The more political competition is relegated to a 
relatively few number of candidates in each district, the less chance political 
outsiders will have to challenge corrupt incumbents. The theoretical expec- 
tation, therefore, is ambiguous for the rule of law: whether SMP or PR 
produces greater respect for property rights and equitable adjudication of 
grievances depends on the relative importance of each contradictory institu- 
tional mechanism (size of district vs. district magnitude). However, theoretical 
reasons exist to expect PR to generate favorable assessments of the rule of 
law. Powell (2000) argues that proportional representation systems generally 
outperform plurality systems in translating votes into either majority govern- 
ments or coalitions close to the median voter. Plurality winners do not often 
hold views close to those of the median voter, yet are afforded a legislative 
majority. Consequently, plurality winners avoid negotiating with smaller 
parties across the ideological spectrum. As such, ethnically-based grievances 
may not be translated into acceptable policies, which may actually lead to 
lower public accountability in SMP systems. Furthermore, low barriers to 
entry in PR systems guarantee minority representation in government once 
a certain electoral threshold is met. This implies less accountability in 
plurality systems, which may produce selective enforcement of the rule of 
law – particularly for ethnically heterogeneous states. I expect systems 
featuring proportional representation to generate more favorable assessments 
of the rule of law than SMP arrangements.   
 
Colonial Legacy 
 
Former British colonies generally use a form of British Common Law whereas 
former French, Belgian, Spanish, Portuguese, German or Dutch colonies 
use a form of Civil Law. Two central differences between these families of 
legal systems may influence the rule of law and subsequently, economic 
development in former colonies.5 First, Common Law legal systems rely on 
judicial precedent rather than legislative precedent to interpret the law. 
Judges in these systems interpret legislation and set a binding precedent for 
future interpretation of the law. These justices effectively add to the body of 
laws, whereas judicial decisions often carry no lasting weight in countries 
with Civil Law systems. Instead, legislative revisions or interpretations of 
the law comprise the entirety of binding legal guidelines on a given matter 
in these countries. The freedom to interpret laws rather than simply enforce 
legislative wishes increases the probability judges with the power to set 
legal precedent will protect the rule of law. This protection extends to the 
rights of foreign firms and private property as demonstrated in La Porta et 
al. (2002) and Djankov et al. (2002). Furthermore, judges’ independent de- 
cisions setting legal precedent protecting the rule of law generate expectations 
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of future protections against the violation of private rights because it is 
harder for judges to backtrack against legal precedent in the future. Judicial 
independence through the ability to set precedent in Common Law systems 
is thus a fundamental element of the legal system protecting both foreign 
and domestic investors and the rule of law.   
Second, judges gain independence from public and private pressures 
through lifetime tenure in Common Law systems. The institutional context in 
which judges operate makes a difference in the types of decisions they 
make.6 For example, Besley and Coate (2003) find elected judges in the 
United States pursue more populist policies than appointed ones in the area 
of employment discrimination. This is not surprising: elected judges are 
beholden to the whims of the public because they must compete in popular 
elections at regular intervals. Elected judges cannot afford to make unpopular 
decisions if they want to keep their jobs. In contrast, appointed justices’ 
insulation from political pressures translates into tougher stances against 
tyranny of the majority and greater protection of political rights. Still, judges 
with short appointments must concern themselves with their post-judicial 
careers in case they are not reappointed. This necessity gives some judges an 
incentive to provide selective benefits and preferential treatment to powerful 
litigants who are potential future benefactors. Similarly, the judges are vul- 
nerable to future threats from the public and private sphere. Threats of 
punishment following judges’ departure from the bench render them more 
likely to rule in favor of powerful litigants who could potentially harm them 
in the future as well. Instead, judges often have lifetime tenure in Common 
Law systems, but rarely do in Civil Law systems. Judges in Common law 
systems are free to focus on the legal merits of a case as well as ignore 
many of the positive and negative incentives associated with short judicial 
terms. Lifetime tenure thus allows judges to contradict majority opinion and 
anger powerful political constituencies if the judges’ interpretation of the law 
demands it. The judiciary is therefore particularly important in preserving 
fragile political rights. However, the courts’ ability to protect minority interests 
against powerful executive or legislative impulses hinges on an independent 
judiciary more prevalent under Common Law systems than in countries 
using legal frameworks based on Civil Law. I therefore include a measure of 
the legal code left behind as a measure of colonial legacy in my statistical 
models to determine if this legacy is connected to the rule of law.   
 
Alternative Explanations 
 
In addition to regime type and political institutions, I estimate the relation- 
ship between the rule of law and a number of variables representing plausible 
alternative explanations. For instance, low-income countries have a greater 
incidence of corruption than high-income countries (Brown, et al. 2011, 
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Treisman, 2000). Bureaucrats in developing societies receive salaries that 
are sufficiently low to entice corrupt behavior. Low-income societies may 
also lack the institutions for detecting public malfeasance – especially when 
such behavior follows ethnic patterns. Minority groups will bear the costs of 
systematic denial of public services in such systems and thus generate lower 
perceptions of the rule of law. I also expect poorer countries to exhibit low 
perceptions of the rule of law. Similarly, income inequality may fall along 
ethnic lines and decrease perceptions of government performance. Research 
on China notes a connection between social unrest and growing economic 
inequality (Khan and Riskin, 1998; Rozelle, 1996). Inequality, the argument 
goes, can generate the popular belief that distributional gains by the elite 
result from collusion with the government through corrupt practices. The 
polarization of ethnic, political, or social groups around the distribution of 
material wealth may frequently constitute the central issue in national politics 
(Lichbach, 1989), producing a heightened awareness or inegalitarian legislation 
or unprotected rights. 
 
3. Model Specification and Estimation 
 
I construct a pooled time series dataset for the years from 1996 to 2010 
stemming from a variety of databases on the dimensions of governance, 
aspects of the political institutions in the included countries, and the coun- 
tries’ socioeconomic attributes. I use data from 1996–2010 because the World 
Bank Institute gathered data on governance, including an indicator for the 
rule of law over this timeframe. I use Alesina et al.’s (2003) data on ethnic 
fractionalization and the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions 
(Beck et. al. 2010) for data on political institutions. I limit my dataset to 
developing countries for two reasons. First, developing countries face great 
barriers to economic development resulting in continued poverty and endan- 
germent for the population of these countries. Determining whether the level 
of EF, which is often high in developing countries, influences the rule of law 
and in turn economic development may be critical for designing policies to 
overcome barriers to economic development. In contrast, industrialized 
countries face different challenges in continuing their economic trajectories 
relative to developing countries. Industrialized have for the most part already 
established the rule of law and do not exhibit very much variance from one 
country to the next. Developed countries are therefore not as interesting to 
study from a theoretical standpoint compared to developing countries because 
they have resolved any problems they may have had with EF and the rule 
of law. Second, I omit developed countries from my dataset for practical 
reasons. I want to know whether ethnic fractionalization influences the rule 
of law while controlling for the level of wealth in a country at the time EF 
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is observed as well as the political institutions in a country. Previous scholar- 
ship suggests the level of wealth is important for the rule of law along with 
the political institutions within a country. Wealth and the structure of the 
political system are therefore important control variables I cannot afford to 
omit from any model of the rule of law. However, the level of wealth within 
a country and the level of democracy are multicollinear with the level of 
ethnic fractionalization among developed, but not developing countries. Includ- 
ing observations from developed countries for wealth and political institutions 
in my dataset would thus bias my model and lead to mistaken inferences 
regarding any connection between EF and the rule of law. I therefore exclude 
developed countries from my model of the rule of law.7  
I estimate my model using time-series, cross-sectional regression with 
panel corrected standard errors. I also estimate a second model using OLS 
with robust standard errors as a robustness check on the first model.8 The 
model I specify includes ethnic fractionalization, institutional variables, a 
number of control variables, as well as both regional and time effect dummy 
variables. I also account for rival hypotheses such as income (GDP per 
capita, PPP) and income inequality. The appendix includes a full discussion 
of the variables, their measurement, and sources for the data. 
 
Table 1 Rule of Law Score Regressed on EF, Political and Economic Variables 
Variable TSCS Coefficient/(PCSE) OLS, Robust SE 
Coefficient/(SE) 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.409 -0.357 
 (0.015)** (0.026)** 
Polity 0.018 0.093 
 (0.007)* (0.030)* 
PR 0.136 0.054 
 (0.141) (0.041) 
Presidentialism 0.042 0.064 
 (0.066) (0.032)* 
Colonial Legacy 0.150 0.192 
 (0.035)** (0.010)** 
GDP/capita (logged) 0.446 0.510 
 (0.029)** (0.030)** 
Rule of Law (Lagged) 0.231  
 (0.092)*  
Income Inequality -0.216 -0.075 
 (0.082)* (0.063) 
Constant -1.140 -2.451 
 (0.002)** (0.070)** 
Region and Year Fixed Effects Included  
Observations 624 712 
R-squared 0.88 0.83 
Panel Corrected/Robust standard errors in parentheses: *significant at 5%; **significant at 1% 
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4. Discussion 
 
The most striking feature of my estimates is the strong negative relation- 
ship between ethnic fractionalization and the rule of law.9 As hypothesized, 
high levels of EF are associated with low levels of the rule of law. Moving 
from a mean level of EF to one standard deviation above the mean results 
in a 19% decline in estimates of the rule of law while holding all other 
variables constant at their means. Of course, there are considerable differences 
between countries aside from their levels of EF that could influence the rule 
of law observations in each country. The level of EF is certainly not the 
only factor determining the level of the rule of law a country experiences. 
However, my estimate does serve as a strong example of how important EF 
is for the rule of law in my dataset. The presence of political institutions in 
the model also produces substantively interesting results: democracy and 
wealth both improve perceptions of the rule of law. Conversely, income 
inequality and non-British colonial legacies damage those perceptions. The 
remaining institutional variables are not statistically significant.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Previous literature connects ethnic fractionalization and the rule of law to 
economic development, but not to each other. I clarify the relationships 
between these concepts and present evidence identifying EF as a strong 
determinant of the rule of law, which in turn leads to economic growth. 
Political institutions, when a full model is specified, are not privileged in 
the ranking of potential determinants of the rule of law. Instead, ethnic 
fractionalization informs our understanding of public perceptions of the rule 
of law in a fully-specified model. Political institutions do not.    
 A government’s ability to make credible their commitment to the rule of 
law is contingent upon the ethnic composition of society. In one sense, my 
research does not provide reasons to be optimistic about taking institutional 
steps to address the perceptions of the rule of law in the face of high ethnic 
fractionalization, because EF does not change very quickly and colonial 
legacy does not change at all (although its impact may become weaker over 
time). However, the strong positive relationship between a country’s wealth 
and the rule of law indicates pro-growth policies may improve the govern- 
ment’s protection of the rule of law even if reforming political institutions 
does not. In this sense, governments do have some policy options at their 
disposals to mitigate the negative influence of EF on the rule of law. Fur- 
thermore, my results provide evidence for a causal chain between EF, the 
rule of law and economic development. They also carry the implication that 
policy solutions designed to increase economic development in countries with 
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high levels of EF will fail if they do not also address EF’s relationship with 
the rule of law. Ultimately, my investigation demonstrates the utility of 
exploring the intermediate connections between macro-level indicators such 
as EF and economic development before policies can resolve problems in 
these areas.  
 
Appendix 
 
This appendix describes the variables collected for the countries included in 
this study. Much of the data was generated by projects at the World Bank: 
The Database on Political Institutions (DPI) and the Governance Matters 
database. The former offers cross-country data chronicling the political in- 
stitutions of 177 states whereas the latter measures perceptions of governance 
in 199. The data stem from work performed by Beck, et al. (2000) and 
Kaufmann, et al. (2010). The variables I employ are catalogued below.  
 
Dependent Variable  
 
Perceptions of the Rule of Law: Preliminary explorations employ the World 
Bank’s Governance IV indicator, which measures the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. It is compiled through 
solicitation of survey responses from elite actors within a given state regard- 
ing the frequency of extra payments to “get things done” and responses to 
other broad questions regarding the predatory nature of the state. These in- 
clude perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability 
of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts and property rights. This 
indicator measures the extent to which fair and predictable rules form the 
basis for economic and political interactions and the extent to which property 
rights are protected. Project researchers use a weighted average of the 
sources for each country as their best estimate of that state’s governance with 
the weights being proportional to the reliability of each source. The result- 
ing aggregate governance indicators have an expected value (across countries) 
of zero, and a standard deviation of one. This suggests that almost every 
score lies between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better 
governance. The original data was gathered from over twenty-five different 
sources by eighteen organizations such as the Afrobarometer, Freedom House, 
Gallup International, Political Risk Services, US Dept of State, World Bank, 
etc. Source: Governance Matters IV Database (Kaufmann, et al. 2010). 
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Independent Variables 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
My primary independent variable is ethnic fractionalization, which describes 
the level of ethnic divisions in a state’s population. The variable I employ 
stems from Alesina et al.’s 2003 dataset. Alesina et al. calculate the likeli- 
hood that two randomly-selected individuals in a country belong to the 
same ethnic group. I use data from 2003, but EF does not change quickly; 
Roeder (2001) establishes this argument by comparing 1985 values with those 
of the 1961. I perform a robustness check with respect to the EF data’s 
validity and reliability by comparing my results with new estimates using 
Fearon’s (2003) data. The results of the regression analysis are very similar: 
all coefficients have same direction, same levels of statistical significance 
and similar magnitudes.      
 
Democracy 
I use the Polity score of each country as a proxy for the level of democracy 
vs. autocracy within its political system. These distinctions are based on the 
general “openness” or “closedness” of political institutions as determined by 
Polity IV scholars through examination of numerous indicators such as the 
constraints on the chief executive, the regulation and competitiveness of 
participation, the openness of executive recruitment, etc. Scores are generated 
by subtracting aggregate “autocracy” from “democracy” to create a range 
of -10 to 10 with ten being the most democratic and -10 the most autocratic 
for 2000. Following Montinola and Jackman (2002), we include in the 
regression both polity and its square. Inclusion or exclusion of the squared 
term does not affect the estimates reported in Table 1. Source: Polity IV 
data set developed by Gurr et al. (2010).  
 
Ln GDP/Capita PPP 
This variable records the natural log of each state’s per capita Gross Domestic 
Product for each year in the database. GDP/per capita is in 2000 dollars and 
is adjusted for purchasing power parity. Source: World Bank, World Devel- 
opment Indicators, 2012. 
 
Colonial Legacy 
This variable records whether the country uses a Common Law or Civil Law 
legal system as a proxy for the legal institutions left behind by colonial 
powers. Common Law legal systems receive a score of “1” while all others 
are scored “0” for this indicator. Source: US State Department. World Law 
database 2012. 
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Income Inequality  
The Gini index measures the level of income inequality within society and 
is recorded as a number between “0” and “1”, where “0” describes perfect 
equality (everyone has identical income) and “1” refers to perfect inequality 
(one person earns all income while all others earn nothing). If the area 
between the line of perfect equality and the Lorenz curve is A, and the area 
underneath the Lorenz curve is B, the Gini coefficient is A/(A+B). This is 
expressed in the data as the numerical equivalent of this percentage, which 
is always between 0 and 100. Source: World Bank, World Development 
Indicators, 2010.  
 
Proportional Representation  
This variable describes whether a state uses proportional representation to 
elect all or a portion of its legislators. A political system is coded “1” if 
either chamber of the legislature is elected based on the percent of votes 
received by their party and/or if Beck, et al.’s sources specifically refer to 
the system in question as “proportional.” The state is coded “0” if these 
conditions do not apply. N/A is recorded if the Legislative Index of Elec- 
toral Competitiveness for the country is 4 or lower, meaning that there is 
competition for seats, albeit in a one-party system. Source: Beck, et al. (2010).  
 
Presidential Systems 
This variable designates political systems as either presidential, assembly-
elected presidential or parliamentary. The system is coded presidential (0) 
if a single executive is elected by popular vote. Additionally, a system is 
coded presidential if the chief executive is elected by an assembly and can 
only be recalled by a two-thirds vote or dissolution of the assembly. The 
system is coded “1” if the assembly elects, but cannot recall the chief 
executive. Finally, in cases where both a president and prime minister exist, 
a system is deemed presidential only after passing a three-part test. First, 
the president must be able to veto legislation while the parliament may only 
override if it possesses a supermajority. Second, the president must be 
allowed to appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers (including the PM) and to 
dissolve parliament. Third Beck, et al. classify a system as presidential (0) 
if the available data does not clarify the executive’s abilities on the first 
two counts, yet Beck, et al.’s sources still refer to the president as the key 
decision-maker. The system is coded as parliamentary (2) if the preceding 
conditions do not hold. Source: DPI (Beck, et al. 2010). 
 
Lagged Rule of Law 
I include a variable for the previous year’s rule of law score to account for 
the possibility the rule of law score for a country in one year is dependent 
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on the previous year’s score. I include a control for this potential temporal 
dependency in the TSCS model.  
 
Geographic Region 
I create regional dummy variables to control for a country’s geographical 
location. Latin American and Caribbean, North America, Asia, Europe, the 
Middle East, and African dummies are included as I anticipate potential 
regional influence on perceptions of corruption. Each country is coded one 
for the region in which it is located and zero for all other regions. 
 
Year Dummies (1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010)   
I create dummy variables for each year in the model to control for any 
unobserved phenomena imparting a temporal bias to my model.  
 
NOTES 
 
1. A summary of New Institutional Economics over the last 30 years provides an 
excellent source detailing institutional explanations in a number of important areas. 
See Brousseau and Glachant, 2008 or Williamson, 2000. Others privilege geographical 
arguments (Gallup, Sachs, Mellinger, 1998 or Hausman, 2001) or international market 
volatility (Radelet and Sachs, 1998). 
2. Knack and Keefer (1997) surpass earlier efforts by demonstrating ethnic 
homogeneity’s impact on the level of social trust, which is often tied to economic 
development while Habyarimana et al. (2007) go even farther and explain EF’s ties 
to public goods provision. Despite these advancements, theoretical gaps remain when 
tying social trust to institutional channels of economic development. Low levels of 
social trust are associated with low levels of growth, but the relationship is devoid 
of a testable causal chain. Alesina et al. (2003) argue ethnic fractionalization influ- 
ences growth through bad policy, but this claim is difficult to evaluate as well.   
3. Institutional economists have made a cottage industry from these assertions. 
See North and Weingast (1989), De Soto (2000), Keefer and Stasavage (2003) among 
many others, Coase, Demsetz, etc.  
4. See Glaeser et al. (2004). 
5. See La Porta et al. 2002, 2004, Djankov et al. 2002, 2003. 
6. See Brace and Gann-Hall (1995). 
7. The countries I select are those in the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators Database that fall more than one standard deviation below the mean in 
2010 GDP/capita PPP  
8. There is a debate as to the appropriateness of time-series, cross-sectional 
regression and panel-corrected standard errors when the dependent variable (in this 
case the rule of law) does not change very rapidly over time. Furthermore, my data 
contains many more cross-sectional observations than temporal observations. In 
these cases the data more-closely resembles a cross-section than a time-series or a 
balanced panel. Times series, cross-sectional (TSCS) estimation with panel-corrected 
standard errors (PCSEs) might bias the estimates and limit inferences. I therefore also 
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estimate a model using ordinary least squares and robust standard errors appropriate 
for cross sectional data and present the results along with TSCS, PCSE estimation. 
The coefficients and significant levels are quite similar across both estimation tech- 
niques.    
9. See Table 1. The magnitude of the relationship between EF and ROL is 
greater than all others’ save GDP/capita and is significant at the .01 level. ‘’ 
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